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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION FEATURES OF THE FEDERAL
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

T

HIS article is limited to discussion of the constitutionality of Titles III and IX of the Federal Social Security
Act,' which provide briefly as follows:

1. Title III 2 provides for grants to states to help
cover the expenses of administering their unemployment
compensation laws.
2. Title IX imposes a tax on certain employers based
on payrolls, with credits for payments made by such
employers to state unemployment compensation funds.
The taxing power of Congress was granted by the Constitution in the following language:
"The Congress shall -have the power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all
duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." a
I

August 14, 1935, c. 531, Title I, § 1, 49 STAT.
"The Federal Social Security Act is an omnibus measure comprising a
miscellaneous group of enactments arranged under eleven 'Titles."' Armstrong,
The Federal Social Security Act, 21 Amr. BAR ASS'N Joue. 786.
2

3

U, S. CowsT. ART. I, § 8.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

It is well-settled that the right of Congress to tax within
its delegated power is unrestrained, except as limited by the
Constitution itself. There is no limitation as to either
amount or subject. Direct taxes must be apportioned, and
excises must be uniform. The classification of taxpayers may
be so clearly arbitrary and capricious as to amount to confiscation, and hence be a taking of property without due
process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution,' but such cases are rare and their circumstances unusual.' All taxes must be really taxes, that is, they
must be laid for a fiscal purpose. But a tax for such a purpose may be laid by Congress in any amount on any subject
within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. In this sense
the power of Congress to tax is absolute.'
The United States Supreme Court in the recently decided
AAA case I has clearly indicated the bases for testing the
constitutionality of the measure here under discussion,
namely:
1. What is the nature of the tax? Is it a direct tax
requiring apportionment, or is it a duty, impost or excise, requiring uniformity?
2. What is the purpose of the tax? Is it a tax to pay
the debts or provide for the common defense or general
welfare of the United States?
3. Do the means adopted for levying and collecting
the tax bear any reasonable relation to the ostensible
4 Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1 (1916); Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442 (1924).
5 Classification held not arbitrary: La Belle Iron Works v. United States,
256 U. S. 377 (1921); Lee Mow Lin v. United States, 250 Fed. 694 (C. C. A.
8th, 1918), certiorari denied, 247 U. S. S18 (1918). Classification held arbitrary:
Nichols v- Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927).
6 McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904); Billings v. United States,
232 U. S. 261 (1914).
7 United States v. Butler, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1935).
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exercise of the power to tax (as distinguished from the
attempted exercise of some power not possessed by the
Congress).
Analysis of the decision in the AAA case discloses that
the Court reached its conclusion by answering each of these
questions in turn. The first one was answered by a finding
that the processing tax was an excise tax, uniform in its
application. Apparently the second question was not definitely answered, although the Court gave an extensive
exposition of the meaning of the famous "general welfare"
clause, an exposition which would have gained in clarity had
an example been cited. In the end, however, the Court stated
that even if the purpose of the tax was to provide for the
general welfare, the measure was invalid because it failed
to meet the third test, that is, so many features of the measure bore no reasonable relation to the ostensible exercise of
the taxing power that its primary purpose was obviously not
to raise revenue, but to regulate agricultural production,-a matter exclusively reserved to the states.
The theses of this article are:
I. The tax provided by Title IX of the Social Security
Act is in form an excise tax which meets the test of uniformity.
II. The primary purpose of the measure (as shown on
the face of the Act, even if Titles III and IX be considered
together as constituting the measure) is to provide a tax to
raise revenues for proper purposes.
1. Substantial revenues will flow into the treasury
available for payment of general government expenditures, even after giving effect to the provisions for offset
and appropriation.
2. Aside from any incidental effect which the appropriation (under Title III) may have of inducing the
establishment of state unemployment compensation
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plans, such appropriation is per se for the general welfare in that it encourages the establishment and aids in
the maintenance of state unemployment compensation
plans, which will provide an effective method for accumulating funds for existing or future emergency unemployment relief.
III. All features of the measure (appropriation, offset, and
criteria) are reasonably related to the proper purpose of the
measure as an exercise of the taxing power, and are not
regulatory or coercive of the states in a matter reserved
solely to the states.
1. The offset is given for payments made by taxpayers to states on the same subject (payrolls) and
for the same general object (providing for unemployment relief) as the federal tax. Thus the offset is properly related to the tax as a fiscal measure in that it (1)
avoids double taxation, and (2) encourages (but does
not coerce) the states to endeavor to provide for unemployment relief (which is constitutionally their problem) and thus to relieve the Federal Government, in
substantial amount, at least, of the necessity for raising
funds for emergency unemployment relief.
2. The conditions of the offset (the "criteria" in
Section 903 (a)) are reasonably necessary to make certain that the amounts allowed as credits against the tax
are substantially as effective in providing for emergency
unemployment relief as if they had been actually collected and appropriated by the government for that
purpose.
3. The appropriation (proper in itself) may have the
incidental effect of encouraging the establishment of
state unemployment compensation plans, and as such
is a legitimate part of the inducement plan.
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4. A tax measure may properly have an incidental
purpose, so long as the means adopted to effect that
purpose do not have the effect of interfering with rights
reserved exclusively to the states. Thus, assuming a
secondary purpose in the present case to induce the
establishment of state unemployment compensation
plans, neither the offset, the appropriation, the criteria,
nor all three together, have the effect either of inducing
the establishment of any particular plan, or of regulating any established plan. Incidentally, this secondary
purpose is itself fiscal in nature, since its effect is to
reduce the need for federal expenditures.
A more informal statement of the general thesis of this
article would be: Titles III and IX of the Social Security
Act, taken together, might appropriately be called "An Act
to Restore the Credit of the Federal Government," or,
popularly, "The Federal Credit Security Act of 1935."
I
What is the nature of the tax in question? Is it a direct
tax requiring apportionment among the states according to
population (as required by Section 2, Clause 3, and Section
9, Clause 4, of Article I of the United States Constitution)?
Or is it a duty, impost, excise, or income tax, requiring only
uniformity (under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, and Article
XVI of the Constitution)?
The tax is obviously not an income tax; neither is it a
duty nor an impost (which relate only to the importation
of goods).' The sole question is whether the tax is a direct
tax or an excise tax.
It may be asserted that the tax is a direct tax, and hence
unconstitutional because it violates the rule against apportionment. It has been held, however, that the words "direct
8

Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433 (1869).
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taxes" were used in the Constitution in their natural and
obvious sense to denote taxes on real property, personal
property, and the rents or income from real and personal
property.'
An excise tax is not a tax upon property or the ownership
of property, but upon the use of property in a certain way. 10
In upholding a tax on carriages as a tax on expense and
therefore not a direct tax, the Court, in Hylton v. United
States," said:
"The constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes,
but only such as Congress could lay in proportion to the census....
As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident that the constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be apportioned.
If this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the
sense of the constitution."

This early statement is probably not a very valuable guide
in distinguishing direct from indirect taxes, but it and subsequent cases show that the Court is willing to go a long
way in upholding taxes as excise taxes, if they have not been
apportioned.
The tax in question is expressly stated in the Act to be
an "excise tax" on "every employer . . . with respect to
having individuals in his employ," and although it is based
upon personal property owned by the employer in the nature
of money used to pay wages, it is undoubtedly a tax upon
the use of said money in a certain way, namely, for the employment of men, and the payment to them of wages, rather
than a direct tax upon the money itself. Accordingly, it
would be considered an excise tax, subject only to the rule of
uniformity-not of apportionment.
9

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429 (1895),

re-

versed on rehearing, 158 U. S. 601 (1895)
10 Examples of taxes held to be excise taxes: Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall.
533 (1869) (state bank notes); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911)
(corporation); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900) (legacies and distributive
shares) ; Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608 (1902) (tobacco); Nicol v. Ames, 173
U. S. 509 (1899) (stock exchange).
11 3 Dall. 171, 174, 181 (1796).
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It is held that a tax is "uniform" when it operates with
the same force and effect in every place where the subject
of it is found. "Geographical uniformity" is all that is necessary, geographical uniformity being synonymous with the
expression "to operate generally throughout the United
States." It makes no difference that the operation or working of the tax may be-wholly different in the case of one taxpayer than it is in the case of another on account of diversity
of state laws which may tend to enlarge or confine the subject of the tax; or that any other factor, such as business
conditions, make the imposition of the tax a more serious
burden on one taxpayer than on another.12
Thus, although the classes of taxpayers, especially those
that may result under Sections 909 and 910, are numerous
and somewhat complicated of determination, nevertheless,
the tax is uniform within the requirements of the Constitution, inasmuch as it applies generally to all employers of each
particular class throughout the United States. It is immaterial that its application will undoubtedly be more burdensome on some employers than on others, depending upon
differences in the amount of contributions payable under
state plans, competitive conditions, relative size of payrolls
to other operating expenses, or other differences in individual
conditions.
It should be parenthetically observed that there is not
even a remote suggestion in Title IX of improper delegation
of legislative power to an administrative body. The directions to the Social Security Board are clear and complete,
leaving the Board a relatively simple task of matching state
plans with criteria under Section 903, and applying a definite
mathematical formula for certifying the additional credit
under Section 910.
12 See: :The cases cited in footnote 10; State of Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S.
12 (1927); Gottlieb v. White, 69 Fed. (2d) 792 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934); Standard
Oil Co. v. McLaughlin, 67 Fed. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933), certiorari denied,
292 U. S. 631 (1934).
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II
Is the purpose of the tax "to pay the debts and provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States"? Or is it a tax for an unauthorized purpose?
Technically, there is no connection between Title HI and
Title IX of the Social Security Act. In .this respect the Social
Security Act can be readily distinguished from the Agricultural Adjustment Act.18 There the tax and the appropriation, besides being provided for in the same Act, were expressly made coextensively interdependent. Here, Title IX,
which levies the tax, is physically separated from Title HI
(which makes the only appropriation in the Act that could
reasonably be construed to have any connection with the
tax). Furthermore, the monies to be raised by Title IX are
not, on the face of the Act, "appropriated in advance" so as
not to go "to the general support of the government." On
the contrary, they are expressly directed to be paid into the
general fund. Moreover, the tax and the appropriation are
not coextensive, because the revenues will greatly exceed the
appropriation, at least until the time when all states have
established "approved" plans; and even when that time
arrives, if ever, the net amount unappropriated under the
Act will be substantial. Hence, it would be logical to maintain that no relation between the two titles can either be
found on the face of the Act or be legally deduced from its
practical operation.
Adoption of this view would make it unnecessary to discuss
the measure at any length in relation to the purpose for
which the tax monies are raised, because as to revenues
going into the general treasury, not appropriated beforehand or earmarked, the only possible presumption is that
such revenues would be used for proper purposes. Title IX,
standing by itself, would meet this test, since it makes no
appropriation.
18

May 12, 1933, c. 25, 48 STAT.
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Incidentally, if the separateness of the two titles should
be thus established, Title III also would probably stand,
regardless of whether or not it provides an appropriation for
a proper purpose, because of the difficulty, under the doctrine
of Massachusetts v. Mellon (the Federal Maternity Act
case),"4 of attacking its constitutionality. This leading case
held that a law appropriating certain sums to be dispensed
by state boards for maternity aids could not be attacked by
either an individual federal taxpayer, or by a state. The
Court held that it had no jurisdiction because there was no
judicial controversy presented to it. As to the individual
plaintiff, his mere general interest in the effect of a law,
without a showing of a definite injury to himself (which
would be impossible because an individual's interest in general government funds is too infinitesimal and remote), was
insufficient to give him standing in- court. As to the state as
plaintiff, it could not claim it was injured by having its reserved rights invaded, because they would not be invaded
unless the state itself voluntarily consented thereto.
No argument is needed to show that the conditional grants
to states, under Title III of the Social Security Act for aid
in administering their unemployment compensation, plans,
are exactly analogous to the conditional grants to' states
under the Federal Maternity Act for aid in administering
their maternity aid plans. Thus Title III, standing alone,
would not be subject to attack.
The AAA decision apparently affirmed the doctrine announced in Massachusettsv. Mellon, and perhaps avoided its
effect only by the fact that the plaintiff, Hoosac Mills, was
contesting a tax actually imposed on it, rather than a mere
appropriation; hence the apparent necessity, paradoxically,
of a questionable appropriation's standing alone if it is not
to fall.
14

262 U. S. 447 (1923).
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It appears, however, from the message of the President
urging passage of the Bill,15 from the reports of the two
Congressional committees which studied the Bill, and from
statements on the floor of Congress in the debates on the
Bill, that Titles III and IX were considered parts of one plan
relating to unemployment compensation.
It is true, of course, that in no case are statements of individual legislators, especially those not in charge of the Bill,
given any consideration in determining the purpose of Congress."8 Only when the purpose of the law is obscure, not
clear upon its face, is it permissible to resort to committee
reports to spell out an ulterior purpose.17 If the Act can
speak for itself, it must be allowed to do so.
Nevertheless, in the light of the Supreme Court's warning
in the AAA case that it is a "novel suggestion that two
statutes enacted as part of a single scheme should be tested
as if they were distinct and unrelated," it would seem advisable not to depend upon the technicality of the mechanical
separation of Titles III and IX, but rather to meet the possible claim that they are component parts of a single plan.
Viewed in that light, it is scarcely possible not to recognize
that Titles III and IX had a dual purpose: (1) Primarily
to provide substantial revenues for the Federal Government;
and (2) Secondarily to reduce the need for federal expenditures by providing a stimulus for the establishment by the
states of plans for unemployment relief, the stimulus con-.
sisting of (a) a certain credit or offset to individual taxpayers, and (b) a grant in aid to states.
The revenue producing features are to be found in Sections 901 and 905 (a) of Title IX. Section 901 reads as
follows:
15 H. R. 7260.
16
McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (1931).
17

STATUTES, 59 C.

J.

953; STATUTEs, 25 R. C. L. 957; Van Camp & Sons

Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1929); United States v. Missouri P.
R. Co., 278 U. S. 269 (1929).
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"On and after January 1, 1936, every employer (as defined in
section 907 of this chapter) shall pay for each calendar year an excise
tax, with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to the
following percentages of the total wages (as defined in section 907
of this chapter) payable by him (regardless of the time of payment)
with respect to employment (as defined in section 907 of this chapter)
during such calendar year:
(1) With respect to employment during the calendar year 1936
the rate shall be 1 per centum;
(2) With respect to employment during the calendar year 1937
the rate shall be 2 per centum;
(3) With respect to employment after December 31, 1937, the
rate shall be 3 per centum."

Section 905 (a) reads as follows:
"The tax imposed by this title shall be collected by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury
and shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States as internal
revenue collections..."

The features providing the stimulus for adoption of state
unemployment compensation plans are to be found (a) in
Sections 902-910, inclusive, of Title IX, which enable indi-

vidual taxpayers to receive credit (up to 90 per centum of
the federal tax) for their contributions to such state plans,
and (b) in Title III, which provides for grants in aid to
states to aid in administration of their plans.
Now, if Congess had levied merely a tax, payable into
the general fund, with no offset and no appropriation, there
could be no doubt, in light of the present extensive debt of
the United States, that such a tax would be prima facie "to
pay the debts ... of the United States" and, hence, would
be for a proper purpose.
Even with the offset and the appropriation, the measure
will produce revenues for the Federal Government. The
amount of gross revenue will vary widely, depending on
business conditions and on the number of states which adopt
"approved" unemployment compensation plans. Even if all
states should adopt such plans, the gross revenue for the
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Federal Government would still amount to ten per centum
of the tax. Of the gross revenue, a portion would (under
Title III) go to states to aid in administering their plans,
and the balance would remain in the treasury. It must be
conclusively presumed that this balance, at least, will be expended for proper purposes.
Thus the sole question which arises upon this phase of
the problem is: Are grants in aid to states for the administration of unemployment compensation plans for the "general welfare"?
The underlying principle upon which this whole discussion
is based is that emergency unemployment relief of the direct
type is a matter of such general nation-wide concern that
levying taxes to provide for it is within the taxing power of
Congress as for the "general welfare."
It is very probable that the constitutional power to provide
ordinary poor relief, if such power exists anywhere, rests
solely in the several states, as a matter of reserved right.
Most state constitutions, however, are just as restrictive as
is the United States Constitution with regard to the exercise
of the taxing power within their jurisdiction. Thus, nearly
all of them authorize exercise of the state taxing power only
for "public purposes."
It is particularly interesting to note, therefore, that tax
levies in several states for the relief of the unemployed have,
as a matter of fact, been attacked as not for a public purpose, but that in each instance such taxes have uniformly
been upheld as for a public purpose.18
If relief for the emergency unemployed in a state is a public purpose from the viewpoint of state taxation, then by
the same token nation-wide relief for the emergency unem:18 Appeal of
Muskegon Heights
City of St. Louis,
161 Atl. 697 (Pa.

Van Dyke, 217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700 (1935); City of
v. Danigelis, 253 Mich. 260, 235 N. W. 83 (1931); Jennings v.
58 S. W. (2d) 979 (Mo. 1933); Commonwealth v. Liveright,
1932).
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ployed is general welfare from the viewpoint of federal taxation. The Court, in the AAA case, stated clearly that mere
"wide-spread similarity of local conditions" does not necessarily create a "situation of national concern." It might be
conceded that wide-spread similarity of ordinary poor relief
conditions would not be a matter of national concern. But
it is inconceivable that the Court would fail to recognize that
wide-spread pauperization, due to protracted nation-wide
unemployment occurring during our periodical depressions,
is a matter of national concern. When, as occurred early in
the present depression, great numbers of people are suddenly thrown upon public relief and the tax resources of the individual states are taxed beyond their capacities to provide
the requisite immediate relief for them, it is unquestionably
not merely the Federal Government's right, but its positive
duty, to utilize its resources to help the states save their
citizens from cruel physical suffering and the desperation
of despair.
The legislatures (and, in turn, the courts) of the states
whose supreme court decisions have just been cited take
notice of the obvious fact that unemployment is the basic
cause of the need for poor relief, so that such relief might
also be termed public unemployment relief.
Unemployment is due to two major causes: (1) Physical
or mental imperfection of the individual which unfits him
for available work; and (2) The economic forces of a depression.
In the light of what has been said, it seems clear that the
responsibility for the care of individuals of the first class,
namely, unemployables, properly belongs to the states. The
responsibility for the care of the individuals of the second
class, the depression unemployed, belongs primarily and
solely to the states except during emergency periods, when
the cash and credit resources of the states are not sufficient
to bear the special and tremendous financial load of exten-
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sive direct relief. During such emergency periods, the Federal Government has the secondary duty of utilizing its
credit resources to bear at least a part of the emergency
burden as a matter of the "general welfare."
The states will always have the problem of ordinary poor
relief. Hundreds of thousands of people, because of their
status as unemployables, are more or less destitute at all
times, while many others are engaged in occupations that
do not readily permit of either public or private reserves
being built up against the time of their unemployment.
Accordingly the states' resources are being continually taxed
for ordinary poor relief, and their tendency is to make no
provision for emergency relief. "Sufficient unto the day is
the evil thereof" seems to be their improvident attitude in
this regard. Naturally, then, they are unprepared to bear
any sudden additional load. Such was the situation developed by the present depression, which was one of the most
severe of our regular cyclical depressions. In view of the
apparently inevitable recurrence of such depressions (according to the weight of economic authority), some feasible
system of money reserves for the unemployed is greatly to
be desired from the standpoint of the ngtion's welfare.
The establishment of any reasonable plan for the payment
of unemployment benefits would (aside from incidental aid
to personal morale, social tone, and sustained mass purchasing power) at least have the effect of lightening the
financial burden of relief during the period of a depression.
Such plans are solely within the reserved powers of the
states, and hence any such plans must be established by the
individual states. The degree of effectiveness of such plans,
individually and collectively, would depend upon the
amount of reserve funds available at the beginning of the
depression and the severity of the depression. But in any
event such establishment would have the result of placing
the states in a better position to assume the full primary
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responsibility for giving direct relief (both ordinary and
emergency) and correspondingly to lighten the secondary
responsibility of the Federal Government to aid in providing
emergency relief.
Accordifigly it would seem natural and highly proper for
Congress to make available to the states moneys to help
defray the cost of administering unemployment compensation plans, and thus to encourage both their establishment
and their conscientious maintenance.
Since it appears clear that the Federal Government has
the power under the "general welfare" clause to appropriate
money for direct relief during emergency periods (and, by
the same token, to tax for that purpose), it logically follows
that it has the incidental power to appropriate and grant
moneys for purposes which will prevent so far as possible
the necessity for the government's making emergency relief
grants to the states in the future. Individuals recognize the
wisdom of putting something aside for a rainy day. Business and industrial concerns make adequate provision for
unfavorable contingencies of all kinds by building up reserve
funds. It would be strange if -the Government were to be
denied the same privilege, particularly in an instance like the
present, where the establishment of reserves in time will
save the proverbial nine of emergency relief expenditures.
The argument may be summarized as follows: Emergency
poor relief is a matter of the general welfare; hence, under
the "general welfare" clause, Congress may levy taxes to
provide funds for aids to the states in providing for emergency poor relief; unemployment is the basic cause of the
need for poor relief, both ordinary and emergency; unemployment compensation plans definitely and directly tend
to lighten the burden of both ordinary and emergency unemployment (poor) relief; hence, Congress may, under the
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"general welfare" clause, levy taxes to provide revenues for
aids to the states in maintaining unemployment compensation plans.
Questions arising from the possible coercive or regulatory
effect of the conditions of the grants under Title III are discussed later herein.
III
The third question remains: Do the means adopted for
levying and collecting the tax bear a reasonable relation to
this ostensible exercise of the taxing power of Congress?
The rule on this point was recently repeated in the Railway Pensions case,1" where the Supreme Court succinctly
stated (in note 5) that when the question is whether Congress has properly exercised a granted power, the inquiry is
whether the means adopted bear a reasonable relation to the
ostensible exercise of the power, and cited Mugler v. Kansas, ° Hammer v. Dagenhart,2 ' and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co."2
It has already been conceded that the measure under discussion has a definite secondary purpose (which is fiscal in
nature), namely, to stimulate the adoption and maintenance
of state unemployment compensation plans. Is not such
stimulation or inducement reasonably related to the power
of Congress to raise revenues by taxation? It may be conceded (it is, in fact, insisted by the writers) that the Constitution contains no grant of power to set up a federal unemployment compensation plan, or to require the states to
set up such plans, or in any way to interfere with the states'
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject. But may not Congress in some way induce the states at their option to set up
such plans which would be truly their own?
19
20
21

22

Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co. 295 U. S.
123 U. S. 623 (1887).
247 U. S. 251 (1918).
259 U. S. 20 (1922).

30 (1935).
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As we have seen, Congress had sufficient reason for attempting to find some way of relieving -the serious federal
credit situation which has arisen during the present emergency (and which is reasonably certain to continue for some
years as a heavy debt burden and to arise again at the time
of future depressions) because of the grants which have
been made to the states to take care of emergency unemployment relief. Congress might have accomplished this
object by any one of the following methods:
1. By levying a simple tax, the revenues from which
would flow unappropriated into 'the general funds for
payment of the present indebtedness of the Federal
Government, and thus would increase its borrowing
power at the time of the next depression.
2. By levying a tax, the revenues from which would
be appropriated to a reserve to be used specifically to
meet future calls for grants for emergency poor relief.
3. By levying a tax, the revenues from which would
be specifically appropriated for grants to the states
upon proper conditions for the purpose of aiding them
not only with the cost of administering unemployment
compensation plans, but also with their total costs
under such plans, including benefits as well as administration.
4. By levying a tax with a partial offset feature calculated to induce the establishment of state unemployment compensation plans, and with appropriation of
part of the net collections from such tax for grants to
the states to aid them in defraying the cost of administering their plans.
In the light of the undoubted right (and practical responsibility) of Congress to levy a tax to provide funds for
emergency unemployment relief as a matter of general welfare, no constitutional objection to any of the- above-mention~d schemes is immediately apparent, though several
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practical objections can doubtless be raised against each.
In any event, Titles III and IX of the Social Security Act
are definitely designed to protect the credit of the United
States in precisely the manner above indicated. For that
reason they have no logical place in an act designated
"Social Security Act." As was stated at the outset, they
would more appropriately have been incorporated in a separate measure designated "Federal Credit Security Act."
Certainly the scheme as a whole is framed as a revenue-providing and expenditure-reducing measure, that is, the Federal Government will either obtain abundant revenues
direct from the taxpayers, available for payment of debts
or for emergency unemployment relief, or both, or the taxpayers will (whether because of the supposed inducement
in the measure or otherwise, who can say?) contribute to
state reserves which will be available for emergency unemployment relief and thus obviate the need for federal expenditures to a substantially equivalent extent.
The general effect of the measure as revenue-producing
and expenditure-reducing may not be sufficient, however, to
validate it. As stated in the AAA case, Congress has no
power to raise revenue for the general welfare other than
by a valid exercise of the taxing power. Hence it is necessary to show that Titles III and IX are not essentially a
scheme to regulate unemployment compensation with the
tax simply incidental thereto, but that they constitute a true
revenue measure, and that none of their features are inconsistent with that characteristic. Specifically, it is necessary
to establish that the appropriationand the offset and the
criteria, all of which, concededly, are component parts of a
single scheme, are not arbitrarily inserted in the measure,
but are all reasonably related to the proper purpose of the
measure as a tax, especially in the sense that they do not
render the measure regulatory or coercive of the states in
a matter within the exclusive realm of the states.
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An offset, or credit, for payments to funds under state
unemployment compensation plans does, in the nature of
things, bear a reasonable relation to the purpose and to the
levying and collection of an excise tax on payrolls. At the
time the Act was passed, state unemployment compensation
plans had been and were being inaugurated, which, in the
first place, were deriving their funds from payrolls, and in
the second place, were calculated to have the effect over a
long period of time of greatly reducing distress due to unemployment and consequently the burden of emergency unemployment relief currently being borne by the Federal
Government. The first of these facts bears a reasonable
relation to the subject of the tax, namely, payrolls; the second bears a reasonable relation to the object of the tax,
namely, to raise revenues, a substantial portion of which are,
or may be, used for emergency unemployment relief. Puting the two together, Congress decided that, in the first
place, it is fair to relieve a subject of the burden of double
taxation, and that, in the second place, by so doing, the
passage of state unemployment compensation plans would
be actually induced, with the effect of reducing the necessity for federal revenues in approximately the same amounts
as the "offset." On both counts, therefore, the particular
offset chosen is reasonably related to the tax as such.
Sections 909 and 910, providing that an employer under
certain conditions may obtain credit against the tax even
when he makes no actual contribution payments, might at
first glance seem difficult to defend as being reasonably related to the tax. As stated later, it would seem that Congress can validly allow offsets only for payments, not for
good behavior. However, until the employer qualifies for
this continuing credit, payments (as opposed to mere "good
behavior") have been made by him, enough payments, in
fact, to establish, on the part of. the particular employer,
private resources or reserves equivalent to the responsibility
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(or voluntary liability) which the government might properly be presumed to have with regard to the relief of such
employer's unemployed employes.
The allowance of additional credit under these conditions
is entirely consistent with the secondary "expenditure-reducing" purpose of Title IX. Payments into state unemployment compensation funds do not represent the only, or
even invariably the most economic, way in which employers
may reduce the need for federal (or state) expenditures for
unemployment relief. Some employers may, by making
special effort and expenditures, be able to give regular employment to their employes. If an employer's record of
contributions and benefits paid under a state law demonstrates his achievement along these lines, he logically should
be permitted additional credit against his federal tax, because his achievement will undoubtedly reduce the need for
federal expenditures to substantially an equivalent extent.
Sections 909 and 910, in permitting such additional credit,
set up merely sufficient safeguards to assure that such extra
credit will not be granted except where the given employer's
performance has in fact served the federal expenditurereducing purpose. They do not interfere or "regulate" within a province reserved to the states. On the contrary, the
practical effect of these sections is to preserve the rights of
the states in the field of unemployment compensation. The
following statement by the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin is directly in point:
"Section 909 of the Social Security Act provides that an employer
may credit and 'offset against the federal payroll tax not only the
money actually paid under a state law, but also such additional
amount (if any) by which his state contributions have been reduced
because of his steady employment experience. These additional credit

provisions are a vital part of Title IX of the Social Security Act.
They are essential to permit state laws to offer employers inducements to regularize employment,---a primary objective of the Wisconsin reserve type of law, and likewise of all other merit rating systems. (If no additional tax credits were permitted under Title IX
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of the Social Security Act, then no reserve or other merit rating system
would be possible under state laws,--since those steady employers
whose state contribution rates were reduced, based on their favorable
experience, would in any event merely have to pay the difference in
federal tax.)" 23

In other words, Sections 909 and 910 make it possible for

the states to give their unemployment compensation laws a
dual fiscal purpose, just as Title IX has a dual fiscal purpose,
namely, to collect revenue and reduce expenditures. These
sections of the federal measure leave each state free to
reduce its contribution collections from an employer to the
extent that he has reduced the state's need for expenditures
to relieve unemployment. The federal measure does not
require any state to include such provisions in its unemployment compensation law; nor does it prescribe any one system which must be used by a state desiring to use meritrating. On the contrary, Section 910 defines several
alternative systems which will be recognized for federal tax
purposes as assuring a genuine expenditure-reducing effect.
If the Supreme Court adheres as strongly to the theory
of individual employer responsibility (as against "pooling")
as enunciated in the Railway Pensions case decision, the
foregoing "additional credit" provision may well prove a
good make-weight when the present case is argued; for certainly it should add considerably to whatever effect the Act
may otherwise have of inducing states and individuals to
assume their own economic and social responsibilities in
respect of that grave problem-unemployment.
In any event, once the requirement of the reasonableness
of the credit in relation to the exercise of the taxing power
in question is established, the matter of prolonging it would
seem to be within the discretion of Congress. At most, such
prolongation only creates a different classification of taxpayers, all members of which class are uniformly affected.
23 Wisconsin Industrial Commission's "Summary Analysis of Chapter 446,
Laws of 1935," released September 30,-1935 (pages 10, 11).
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Having determined that an offset, per se, for contributions
under state unemployment compensation plans bears a
reasonable relation to an excise tax on payrolls, the question
arises as to the propriety of the "criteria" set forth in Section 903 (a), according to which only contributions under
such plans as contain certain stipulated characteristics will
qualify for the offset. Are these criteria merely incidental
parts of the tax, properly related to its purpose as a tax, and
to its levy and collection; or are they "regulations," and as
such the heart of the Act, around which the tax references
are cleverly draped?
Suppose that prior to the imposition of this federal payroll tax, a great number of states had established unemployment compensation plans. Would not Congress have wished
to write into its law some offset for amounts paid by emiployers under such plans? Not, of course, if Congress had
planned merely to raise money. But Congress could have
been easily persuaded to allow such offset on the strength of
the argument that the Federal Government had theretofore
been getting from employers contributing to effective state
plans the benefit of the contributions made thereunder, and
that the imposition of such federal tax would be an unfair
additional burden.
In providing for such an offset, however, Congress would
wisely attempt not to give credit except where credit was
due, and would carefully define the kind of plan, for contributions to which the offset would be given. Would the definition be different from the "criteria" of Title IX? Perhaps
in certain details, according to wisdom born of longer experience than the 74th Congress had, but not in kind. They
would all tend with logical consistency to insure the effectiveness of the plans as measures aiding the federal credit
(by lightening the future-and possibly present-load of
federal expenditures for emergency unemployment relief)
by stipulating that no contributions would be "offset" except
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such as were made to adequate and properly safeguarded
funds, readily available.for the unemployed-in other words,
plans that really deserved the name of unemployment relief
plans. Congress might better collect the whole tax rather
than allow credit for moneys that would be spent in a way
not tending directly or indirectly to aid the federal credit
by lightening the government's emergency relief burden.
Do the "criteria" of Section 903 (a) of Title IX meet this
test? From the standpoint of the constitutionality of the
measure comprising Titles III and IX as a whole, this determination is unimportant because the measure provides
for severability of its various provisions in the event that
any of them do not meet the test of constitutionality. But
comment on this question is illuminating to emphasize the
fact that each of the criteria may be individually attacked
as to constitutionality.
Under the rule of A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton 24 a particular criterion would not be stricken if it interfered to
some extent with the rights of the states, but if in addition
to that fault it bore no reasonable relation to the purpose
or collection of the tax it would be void. In the light of this
rule, the following conclusions seem justifiable:
1. The condition that the fund be built up for two
years before benefits become payable represents the
long-range view of building reserve funds that will be
reasonably adequate for future emergency unemployment; as such, it is entirely consistent with the purpose
of protecting the federal credit.
2. The condition that the funds be deposited in the
United States Treasury seems necessary for proper
safeguarding of funds, so that they will be available
when needed to protect the federal credit.
24

292 U. S. 40 (1934).
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3. The condition that benefits be paid through public
employment offices or other agencies approved by the
Board seems improperly regulatory. The probable purpose of this condition is to assure that there will be a
minimum of confusion, uncertainty, delay, and fraud
in payments of benefits. However, at the country's
present level of experience with unemployment compensation, it is rather presumptuous of Congress to
assume that the states will not provide as satisfactory
machinery for payment of benefits as the Board could
suggest. But in any event, this condition has no direct
relation to protection of the federal credit, and hence
is probably bad.
4. The condition that the funds be paid only for unemployment compensation is obviously reasonable, for
if such moneys were used for other purposes there
would not be the intended protection of the federal
credit.
5. The condition that the plan be subject to amendment by the state legislature seems reasonably necessary to prevent one legislature from tying the hands of
succeeding legislatures (if that be possible) by setting
up restrictive provisions which would prevent utilization of the fund for payment of unemployment benefits
during emergency periods. Furthermore, this provision
protects, rather than interferes with, the continuing
control of the states over their plans.
6. The condition that compensation shall not be denied under certain conditions relating to labor disputes
seems clearly regulation of a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states, and has no relation to
the purpose of the measure.
The criteria of Title III, that is, the seven conditions in
Section 303 (a) upon which the Federal Government will
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grant monies to a state to use in meeting the costs of administering an unemployment compensation plan, would probably not need to be subjected to the foregoing test if Title
III could properly be construed as standing alone, since, as
before explained, under the doctrine of Massachusetts v.
Mellon25 a conditional grant-in-aid to states from general
funds is not subject to attack regardless of what its conditions are. If said title, however, is to be construed with
Title IX as a component part of a single scheme (as the
writers believe it should be), its criteria (each severable)
will be subject to the same tests as applied above to the
"criteria" of Title IX. Most of the criteria of Section
303 (a) are the same as those in Section 903 (a), and the
same comments would apply to them. The remainder deal
with reports by the beneficiary states to the government, on
matters directly affecting the amount of the grant, and as
such seem entirely reasonable.
Although not precisely pertinent to a discussion of the
present Act, nevertheless it is interesting to consider whether
or not Congress could allow any specified out-of-pocket
payments whatever, under a state law or not, as an offset
to a federal excise tax. If so, Congress could perhaps "induce" the establishment of state (or private) old age pension plans (as it has attempted to do along different lines
in Section I of the Social Security Act), state health plans,
and the like, by a further excise tax on payrolls or some
other convenient object, with an "offset" feature for
amounts contributed under such plans. It is the writers'
conviction that such an inducement tax would be valid only
if, as in the present case, the offset bore a reasonable relation to both the subject and the purpose of the tax. But in
any event, it is clear that no such inducement program for
minimum wages and maximum hours, or divorce laws, or
unfair trade practices, or the like (matters within the ex25

Op. cit. supra note 14.
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clusive jurisdiction of the states), could well be devised, for,
there being no money to pay under such laws or plans, there
would be no "offset" available, and only a "penalty" or
"purchase of compliance" tax could be used-and these, of
course, would be invalid.
Again, though not affecting the constitutionality of the
Act as written, nevertheless it should be pointed out most
emphatically that, if the offset and the appropriation in all
their features must be reasonably related to the tax (and it
is believed that they must), every future modification of the
"criteria" for approval of state systems under both Title
III and Title IX must be carefully scrutinized to determine
whether or not such modification bears a proper relation to
the taxing power; in other words, whether the modification
is on the one hand reasonably calculated to maintain the fair
equivalency of the offset to the direct tax, or on the other
hand designed merely to regulate details of the operation
of the state systems and hence interfere with powers reserved solely to the states. Thus, although the Act as written meets the test (except perhaps as to one or two of the
"criteria"), each future modification must be separately
tested, and will raise a separate and distinct question of fact
as to constitutionality.
At any rate, it would appear from the foregoing that
mechanically, so to speak, the offset and the criteria generally do meet the test of reasonable relation. A more fundamental objection to the appropriation and the offset with
their "criteria" still remains to be met. This is that they
constitute an attempt by Congress, under the mere guise of
the taxing power, to regulate unemployment compensation,
a matter solely within the province of the states; that the
measure consisting of Titles III and IX of the Act, is essentially not a revenue-providing measure, but a regulatory
one. It is believed that this objection is not sound.
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The only power granted to Congress by the Federal Constitution is the power to tax, not to regulate. Nevertheless,
the taxing power may be, and undoubtedly often has been,
used to regulate, or to bring about other secondary results,
even where such results were "beyond the constitutional
power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly
addressed to their accomplishment," 2 and still has been
considered within the authority of Congress.
Three classes of such cases can readily be cited: One
represented by such cases as Veazie Bank v. Fenno,27 where
a tax of ten per cent on state bank notes tended to drive
such notes from circulation, and McCray v. United
States,2" where a tax of ten cents a pound on colored oleomargarine, as against one-quarter cent a pound on white
oleomargarine tended to destroy the market for, and thus
production of, colored oleomargarine (see also the more recent oleomargarine case of A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton29); another represented by such a case as State of
Florida v. Mellon, 0 where the fact that the whole amount
of a state's inheritance tax would be allowed against the
federal inheritance tax up to 80 per centum of the federal
tax undoubtedly tended to induce the states to levy inheritance taxes in order to collect for themselves moneys that
would otherwise go to the Federal Government; and the
third by such cases as: (1) Felsenheld v. United States,,"
where a stamp tax act forbade a package to contain any but
the article subject to the tax; (2) Dougherty v. United
States, 2 where a butter and oleomargarine tax act prescribed
certain regulations as to marking, stamping, and branding
28 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, op. cit. supra note 24.
27 Op. cit. supra note 10.
28 Op. cit. supra note 6.

29 Op. cit. supra note 24.
80 Op. cit. supra note 12.
81
82

186 U. S. 126 (1902).
108 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1901), certiorari denied, 181 U. S. 623 (1901).
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packages; and (3) Nigro v. United States,3" where an act
imposing a tax upon the sale of narcotics and making it a
criminal offense to sell narcotics except in certain stamped
packages and pursuant to a written order upon a prescribed
form tended to discourage undercover traffic in such drugs.
In all of the foregoing cases, the secondary results obtained were held to have been purely incidental and not
apparent on the face of the acts involved. All provisions of
the respective acts were held to have borne a proper relation
to the exercise of the taxing power. This in spite of the fact
that the revenue-producing functions of several of the acts
involved were almost negligible. For instance, the federal
estate taxes, prior to the enactment of the amendment in
question in the Florida case,84 had no offset. The amendment, therefore, was not a revenue producer-it was very
decidedly a revenue reducer. Nevertheless, it left the Act
as a whole a revenue producer. So, also, in the Nigro
case,3 5 probably the deciding factor of the decision was that
the Act (as amended) provided more than "nominal" revenue-though the revenue amounted to only a million dollars a year, a mere drop in the bucket compared to the
revenue which will be raised by Title IX.
On the other hand, there have been several cases where
the court held that the act showed on its face that it was
primarily an effort to regulate a matter wholly within the
reserved authority of the states, and that its operative provisions disclosed no reasonable relation to the taxing power.
33 276 U. S. 332 (1928). It should be pointed out that this case was decided
after Hammer v. Dagenhart (the First Child Labor case, op. cit. supra note 21),
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (the Second Child Labor case, otherwise known
as the Child Labor Tax case, op. cit. supra note 22), and Hill v. Wallace (the
Grain Futures case, 259 U. S. 44 (1922) ), thus settling the question of constitutionality raised by the five to four decision in United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S.
86 (1919), and mentioned in Dougherty v. United States, op. cit. supra note 32.
84 Op. cit. supra note 12.
85 Op. cit. supra note 33.
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The most familiar of these cases are the Child Labor Tax
37
case 6 and the Grain Futures case.
The Child Labor Tax Law " levied an excise tax equivalent to ten per centum of the entire net profits received or
accrued during any year in which the taxpayer employed
one or more children under the age of 16 years (except in
cases of bona fide mistake), and authorized inspections by
the Secretary of Labor and the Collector of Internal Revenue. The Act thus disclosed on its face that the sole purpose of Congress was to impose a penalty upon the employment of child labor, and the Supreme Court declared it to
be an unlawful attempt to regulate the employment of child
labor in the states, which is an exclusively state function
under the Federal Constitution and within the reservations
of the Tenth Amendment.
The Court carefully distinguished between cases where
revenue was the primary object of the tax, and regulation
was used merely to aid in the collection of the tax, and cases
where regulation was the primary purpose of the tax, and
the tax was used as a penalty to enforce the regulation. 9
The tax under consideration in the Grain Futures case 40
was one of 20 cents a bushel on all contracts for the sale of
grain for future deliveries, except sales on boards of trade
designated as contract markets by the Secretary of Agriculture upon fulfillment by such boards of certain conditions
86

Op. cit. supra note 22.
87 Op. cit. supra note 33. The first Child Labor case (op. cit. supra note 21)
involved a wrongful use of the interstate commerce power to regulate a matter
purely within the reserved powers of the states, and is not in point here.
s8 40 STAT. 1138-40, § 1200.
80 The Court cited: Veazie Bank v. Fenno (the State Bank Notes case), op.
cit. supra note 10; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., op. cit. supra note 10; McCray v.
United States (the Oleomargarine case), op. cit. supra note 6; and United States
v. Doremus (the Narcotic Drug Act case), op. cit. supra note 33. All of these
cases were shown to have involved taxes for revenue, any regulations being only
incidental and having a reasonable relation to the purpose or enforcement of

the tax.
40 Op. cit. supra note 33.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

and requirements set forth in the Act, including the adoption
of a specifically outlined code of ethics and procedure, and
an agreement to enforce the same. This taxWas in addition to
an existing tax of 25 cents on every $100 value of such sale,
imposed by the Revenue Act of February 24, 1919, and was
a very heavy tax, amounting according to the kind of grain
from 20% to 50% of its value. The Secretary of Agriculture
was given the power to determine what boards were complying with the law, and to disqualify boards found not to be
complying. The Court there held:
"The manifest purpose of the tax is to compel boards of trade to
comply with regulations, many of which can have no relevancy to
the collection of the tax at all. .

. When this purpose is declared

in the title to the bill, and is so clear from the effect of the provisions
of the bill itself, it leaves no ground upon which the provisions we
have been considering can be sustained as a valid exercise of the
taxing power."

After citing the Child Labor Tax case and the cases therein
cited, the Court went on:
"It was pointed out 41 that in none of those cases did the law
objected to show on its face, as did the Child Labor Tax Law, detailed
regulation of a concern or business wholly within the police power
of the state, with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of such
regulation."

To this illustrious line of cases can now be added the AAA
Processing Tax case.42 That case held essentially that it was
evident from the face of the statute that regulation (in a
field reserved to the states), and not revenue, was the primary object of the. law, and that the tax was a mere "incident of such regulation," being used as a penalty to enforce
the regulation-or rather, as the Court said, it was used "to
purchase a compliance" which Congress was "powerless to
command."
These cases clearly show, with respect to the tax levied by
Title IX of the Social Security Act, that Congress has the
41
42

In the Child Labor Tax case, op. cit. supra note 22.
Op. cit. supra note 7.

THE FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

absolute power to levy the tax as such. They also, perhaps,
show on the one hand that if Congress had laid down a set
of procrustean detailed regulations relating to unemployment compensation, and levied the tax against those who
violated such regulations, the "tax" would be considered a
"penalty" for an act over which Congress has no authority,
or as otherwise stated, an "instrument to enforce a regulation of matters of state concern with respect to wvhich the
Congress has no authority to interfere," and, hence, unconstitutional; or on the other hand that if Congress had levied
the tax against employers (or any other class of taxpayer)
and concurrently appropriated the revenues to such employers as were complying with unemployment compensation
plans prescribed by Congress, the "tax" would be considered
a "purchase of compliance" which Congress was "powerless
to command"-a "scheme for purchasing with Federal funds
submission to Federal regulation of a subject reserved to the
states" and, hence, unconstitutional. This, however, is not
our present factual situation.
In the first place, the measure under discussion is (admittedly) not a simple tax. Its provisions, in fact, are very
complicated (as compared, for instance, with the simple tax
on employers and employes under Title VIII of the Act).
But is the tax purely an incident to "regulations" in a forbidden field, as in the Child Labor Tax case, the Grain
Futures Tax case and the AAA Processing Tax case? In
other words, has Congress laid out a course of action in a
matter outside its jurisdiction and merely adopted the tax
to force or induce compliance therewith?
As stated before, any possible desire Congress may have
had to regulate unemployment compensation should not be
confused with the actual action it has taken. It is not detrimental to the thesis of this article to suspect that Congress
perhaps legislated better than it knew, in the sense that,
with a purpose in mind that might possibly have rendered
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the law unconstitutional had it appeared too prominently
in the Act, it kept that purpose from appearing upon the
face of the Act. The controlling consideration as far as
constitutionality is concerned is not what Congressional
Committees reported or what Congressmen said in debate,
but what law they passed after they got through talking.
The question therefore remains, Does the Act, either by
express statement or necessary effect, evidence a primary
purpose of Congress to regulate unemployment compensation?
The answer is No. The title certainly states no such purpose. The word "aid" is there used, but can only have reference to Title III, providing for grants to states for unemployment compensation administration, and possibly to
Section 904, providing for the investment and handling of
state unemployment compensation funds by the Federal
Government. The part of the title of the Act most applicable to Title IX reads "to raise revenue."
The body of Title IX contains no express statement of
intent, other than to levy a tax. The Title can be fairly construed to show only an intent to levy an excise tax on payrolls, with a recognition of the fact that the states may also
levy such a tax (or require employers, under state supervision, to make contributions to a certain fund, which
amounts to the same thing), and hence that it would be only
fair to allow all or a part of the state contributions to be
credited against the federal tax.
Is then the necessary effect of the Act regulation of unemployment compensation, so that the intent to regulate could
be imputed to Congress? The answer again is No.
There is no coercion of individual taxpayers, nor of states,
not even the type of coercion "by economic pressure" condemned in the AAA case. There is no doubt a definite inducement, as in the Floridacase, for employers to urge their
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respective state legislatures to pass laws enabling them to
contribute to funds which they know will be spent, if not
for their own respective employes, at least for the benefit
of unemployed citizens of their own respective states, rather
than to require them to pay the same amounts to Washington with no assurance that they will benefit in proportion to
their contributions. But this is not interference with states'
rights; the states are still free to provide for any unemploymen compensation plans they want, or none at all, and the
expense to their taxpayers would be approximately the same
in either event. The plans would be created by the states,
administered by the states, changed by the states, discontinued by the states; the amount and the method of collection of contributions would be provided for by the states;
the amount and the time and manner of payment of benefits
would be according to the wisdom of the states. Sufficient
leeway is given so that a state could set up any kind of plan,
from almost a pure relief system to a pure system of reserves
to be used only during emergency unemployment periods.
Thus, whereas the effect of the schemes in the Child Labor
Tax case, the GrainFutures case, and the AAA case was the
complete elimination of state control over the subject matter, the effect of the measure under discussion is precisely
to induce and help the states to assume themselves complete
control of the subject matter. The tax, as the Court said in
Knowlton v. Moore,4" is "a burden cast upon" the employer,
"and not upon the power of the state to regulate."
Furthermore, the principal inducement here used is the
offset, which was not present in either of the three mentioned
cases. In them if the taxpayer complied with the federal
scheme, he paid no tax (or he received benefits); if he failed
to comply, he paid the tax (or he received no benefits). Under this Act, however, as under the inheritance and income
tax laws, he pays tax (or the equivalent of a tax) in any
43

Op. cit. supra note 10.
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event, either to the state or to the Federal Government or
to both, the state tax payments (or contributions), if any,
being allowed in each case as a partialcredit against the federal tax. The designated credits in this case happen to be
contributions under unemployment compensation plans,
and Congress says only that such plans must contain certain
essential characteristics, otherwise they will not definitively
qualify as unemployment compensation plans at all. Any
effect such offset might have of inducing (much less regulating) the passage of state unemployment compensation
laws would in legal contemplation be too remote from the
levying of the tax to be considered a necessary effect of the
tax. And in any event, the Federal Government will obtain
some revenue-not merely a nominal amount, not merely
a million dollars a year as in the Nigro Narcotics case," but
10% of 3% of the country's business and industrial payrolls--close to a hundred million dollars.
Thus the "offset" in this case is quite obviously an entirely different creature from "regulations," and its use brings
the case out of the classes represented by the Child Labor
Tax case, the Grain Futures case, and the AAA case, and
puts it in line with the FloridaInheritance Tax case. There
Congress allowed taxpayers to credit state inheritance tax
payments against federal inheritance tax payments. Here
-Congress, in levying a tax on payrolls, allows as a credit
certain other payments which the taxpayers may be required
to make in the states on the same tax subject, and for practically the same ultimate object or purpose. Naturally the
offset must be defined. In the Floridacase "inheritance tax"
was given its legal definition; and the "criteria" in Title IX
of this Act are indisputably not regulations but constitute
collectively merely a careful definition of the kind of payments that Will be allowed as a credit against this payroll
tax.
44 Op. dt. supra note 33.
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What has been said concerning the offset might well be
repeated as to the appropriation under Title III: Any effect
which such appropriation might have of inducing the passage of state unemployment relief plans would in legal contemplation be too remote to be considered a necessary effect
of such appropriation. And it obviously provides as little
regulation of, or interference with, the operation of such
plans as the offset does.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion and summary, it cannot be emphasized too
strongly that Title IX of the Social Security Act is not a
new departure in tax procedure. True, it is not a simple
tax-for-revenue measure. It falls definitely into the category of those taxes which, as a matter of fact, but not of
appearance, had another purpose than merely the direct
raising of revenue. But its incidental purpose is definitely
fiscal, namely, to reduce the need for federal expenditures.
If the Supreme Court approved a relatively heavy tax on a
thing, tending to drive it out of existence, such as state bank
notes or oleomargarine, and a relatively light tax on a thing,
coupled with strict packing, or branding, or sales regulations,
and above all an inducement tax with a simple offset feature, where the right to, and amount of, offset was easily
ascertainable, such as inheritance taxes, none of which produced much more than nominal revenues, and all of which
interfered to a greater or less extent with matters within the
police powers, or other powers exclusively reserved to the
states, why should it not approve this tax, which is nothing
more than an inducement tax with a not unduly complex
offset feature, the whole effect of which leaves the Act primarily a revenue measure, with no regulatory effect on matters within the exclusive control of the states?
Every material provision of both the appropriation and
the offset bears a proper relation to the fiscal purpose of the
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tax. The "criteria" in Sections 303 and 903 (with several
possible exceptions) are not regulations; they are nothing
but conditions, in the one section, and definitions, or exclusions, if you please, in the other. The Act marks the effort
of Congress not to coerce any person or any state into a
prescribed course of action, but to provide large federal
revenues for general purposes, and to recognize the indirect
financial benefit which will accrue to the Federal Government by reason of the establishment in the various states of
reserve funds for unemployment relief, and thus to equalize
and if possible lighten individual tax burdens. Instead of
delaying this act of fairness until only two or three states
would remain without unemployment compensation laws (as
it did in the case of inheritance taxes), it provided, at a time
when only five or six states had plans, that proper credit be
given taxpayers as their respective 'states fall into the new
but already definitely established line of march toward unemployment compensation.
Stated in simplest language, Titles III and IX of the Act
express the following Congrestional philosophy. We, the
Congress, have met the actuality of responsibility for emergency unemployment relief-a responsibility properly belonging to you, the states. We have been obliged to meet
this responsibility through the compulsion of humanitarian
necessity and because you did not make adequate provision
against the contingency of the emergency.
Meeting this responsibility has strained the government
credit. Since we have no assurance that you will relieve us
of the ultimate responsibility during future depressions, we
have decided to make adequate preparation to that end by
levying a tax to replenish the government's depleted treasury and thus place the government in a financial position to
pay off the debt already incurred and to meet the aforesaid
responsibility during the next depression. If, however, you
elect to make adequate preparation by the collection of
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funds for the payment of future emergency unemployment
benefits, we will grant you administrative aid and tax offset.
We care not what kind of relief plan you adopt just so long
as it has the effect of causing you to meet your emergency
humanitarian obligation of caring for your unemployed
people and thus relieving us of that responsibility. The aids
which we are offering to you are made conditional, not with
the purpose of regulating you in the selection of the type of
relief plan or the manner of your administration thereof, but,
on the other hand, merely with the intention of making certain that your relief plans in their adoption and administration will relieve us of your responsibility of alleviating the
physical and mental suffering of the poverty of emergency
unemployment.
The foregoing philosophy seems to exemplify business
sagacity rather than constitutional heresy.
William E. Brown,
Harold W. Story.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

